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THE WISCONSIN EXEMPTION CLAUSE DEBATE 
OF 1846: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
ON THE REGULATION OF DEBT 
BERNARD R. TRUnLLo• 
We live in a time of crisis for consumer bankruptcy. Despite good 
economic times in the United States, an unprecedented number of 
individuals and households are going bankrupt. Dramatic changes in the 
distribution of credit have created new possibilities and pitfalls for the 
consumer and worked fundamental changes in the profile and political 
power of the creditor who stands to lose when the consumer goes broke. 
These conditions have created an environment for reconsidering, in 
Congress and in popular conversation, the appropriate measure of relief 
that the laws of the United States should afford to an individual debtor. 
The purpose of this short Article is to give our contemporary crisis 
some historical perspective. A central feature of U.S. consumer 
bankruptcy policy has been the idea of the ''fresh start": filing bankruptcy 
is to be a new beginning for the debt-laden consumer. To restore the 
debtor as a potentially productive member of the economy, the bankruptcy 
process must allow the debtor to retain a suffici~nt level of basic 
resources. Implicit in the fresh start approach is the notion that legal 
institutions should attend to the economic and structural facets of debt 
(Le. create conditions that will get the debtor back on her feet and into 
the economy as soon as possible), leaving scrutiny of the moral aspects 
of debt to other institutions more competent to the task. The present 
crisis challenges us to ask how conmlitted we,_ as a society, should remain 
to this idea of the fresh start. 1 
To deternline whether we should reaffirttl our social COJlllnitment to 
the fresh start, it may be useful to remind ourselves of why such a policy 
was chos_en in the first place. There_ was a time when the fresh start was 
not an enshrined objective of our laws on debt collection, but instead 
merely one of a number of directions that society could take. This essay 
• Assistant Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School. A.B., 1988_, 
Princeton University; J.D., 1992, Yale Law School. Thanks to Chris Dickerson, Arthur 
McEvoy, Michael Morgalla, Gary Rowe, Victoria Trujillo and William Whitford. 
1. See William C. Whitford, Changing Definitions of Fresh Start in U.S. 
Bankruptcy lAw, 20 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 179 (1997)(describing eroding commitment to 
goal of fresh start) . 
• 
• 
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considers such a time by taking a close look at a debate over a proposed 
clause that occurred at Wisconsin's Constitutional Convention of 1846. 
. . 
The clause, which would have exempted some debtor's property from the 
collection efforts of creditors, was among the first "exemption'' laws 
considered in the United States. Study of the Wisconsin Exemption 
Clause Debate of 1846 shows that the eventual selection of the fresh start 
was not the inevitable destiny of a nineteenth-century frontier population, 
. . 
but rather a deliberate policy choice, made for reasons that may or may 
not remain persuasive today. 
By reviewing the Wisconsin Exemption Clause Debate of 1846, this 
Article hopes simply to e·stablish that a central question of nineteenth-
century Wisconsin debt regulation resembles a central question in our 
contemporary conversation: na1nely, should the law treat debt primarily 
as. a moral or an economic problem? Giving historical perspective to a 
contemporary occasion of choice is not, of course, the same thing as 
making an argument that we should strengthen or weaken our present 
commitment to the fresh start and the particular approach to the law of 
debt collection that it entails. But re-visiting one foundational moment of 
bankruptcy law may help clarify our thinking as. we confront .another. 
Finally, this Article will conclude with some tentative thoughts 
comparing the contemporary crisis in bankruptcy to another crisis 
presently occurring in the. field of immigration, as well as some equally 
tentative thoughts regarding "debt" as .a useful organizing concept for 
analyzing U.S. law. 
I. CONTEMPORARY CRISIS IN BANKRUPTCY LAW 
• 
Federal laws affording bankruptcy relief to debtors are receiving a 
terrific amount of attention these days. Perhaps there is a ron1antic reason 
for this renewed interest, as lawyers make ready to celebrate tbe twentieth 
anniversary of the enactment of the B.ankruptcy Code of 1978 ("Code''). 
A more mundane, but perhaps realistic reason for boundless energy of the 
bankruptcy reform movement is the fact that bankruptcy petitions are 
soaring, and this in an economy that most agree is doing well. The 
Administrative· Office of U.S. Courts reported that there were more than 
1.4 million bankruptcy petitions filed in the calendar year 1997, with 
filings by individual consumers accounting for 1.35 million of the total~2 
For a short-term perspective on these numbers, consider that the number 
2. See Breaking News from A.P. (visited Feb. 27, 1998) 
<http://www .nytimes.com ·> . 
·, 
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of filings increased 26% from 1995 to 1996,3 and increased ,another 19% 
from 1996 to 1997.4 For long-term perspective, consider that last year's 
consumer filings represent a 742% increase over the consumer filings of 
twenty years ago when the Code was new. 5 
Numbers like these require some explanation. One likely -reason for 
the explosion in consumer bankruptcies is the explosion in the extension 
of credit by lenders to "subprime" borrowers; that is, people whose low 
income, youth, prior credit history or other factors make it more likely 
that they would default on the loan. The number of subprime loans 
(mainly in the form of credit cards issued to high-risk. borrowers) 
increased as lenders realized that charging higher interest rates created a 
handsome profit even after writing off the loans that went bad. 
Corresponding with this market reality is the political reality that 
unsecured lenders (i..e., entities who lend money without having the 
borrower pledge some property as collateral), who do most of the 
subprime lending, are now, in stark contrast to the recent past, quite well 
organized and capable of assuring Congressional responsiveness to their 
concerns .. 
Prior to 1978, when the Code was enacted, the profile of a typical 
unsecured lender resembled the comer grocer. A borrower would wander 
down Main Street, doing business on credit with the butcher and the 
baker and the candlestick maker. 6 When the borrower went bust, such 
merchants had very little recours,e~~ Because unsecured lenders were small 
and dispersed, and each had relatively few dollars at stake in any potential 
default, they had very limited political power. The Code reflects this 
imbalance on unsecured lenders vis-a-vis secured lenders (such as banks 
that loan money by using the borrower's car or house as collateral). 
Now, the profile of the typical unsecured lender looks more like 
CitiBank.7 When a borrower wanders down Main Street today, she uses 
her credit card to fund her purchases, thus creating a debt owed not to the 
individual merchant, but rather to the bank or financial institution whose 
DaJlle is on the credit card. Now when the borrower goes bust,. it is a 
• 
3. See NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT at ii 
(1997)[hereinafter NBRC REPORT]. 
' 
4. See Breaking News from A. P., supra note 2. 
S. See NBRC REPORT, supra note 3, at ii. 
6. There were, of course, plenty of ,credit cards in circulation prior to 1978, 
along with a good concentration of unsecured debt owed to small loan companies. The 
difference between the nature of unsecured consumer debt prior to 1978 and today is a 
(perhaps dramatie) difference of degree rather than a difference of kind. See generally 
TERESA SULLIVAN ET AL., AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS (1989). 
' ' 
7. Perhaps to be re-christened "CitiGroup" after its merger with Travelers' 
Insurance. See WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 1998·, at 1. 
750 '. .. WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
relatively small number of well-financed and highly organized lenders that 
stand to lose a lot of money. 
Whatever the causes behind the explosion in consumer bankruptcies, 
attention has focused on whether filing for bankruptcy offers "too much 
relier' to the individual debtor. The debate about whether the law affords 
debtors too much relief goes like this: Creditors claim that debtors filing 
for bankruptcy feel too little pain, and so are turning to bankruptcy as a 
sort of "financial planning" tool, as the first recourse. Behind this is the 
assertion that bankruptcy has lost its ''stigma," and that the law should be 
refortned to restore the negative moral charge to a decision to file for 
bankruptcy. 8 Those who support a higher level of relief for debtors 
believe that, while the accumulation of debt may well have implications 
for personal morality, the ·u.S. Congress and other institutions of the state 
should limit their treatment to the economic and structural aspects of debt 
regulation;9 allowing the debtor enough basic resources to return to the 
financial fray on firtn footing after the bankruptcy will benefit the entire 
economy. 
Having sketched the contours of the contemporary debate, let us now 
tum to the events of 1846 Wisconsin. 
II. THE EXEMPTION CLAUSE DEBATE OF THE 1846 CONVENTION 
When delegates from around the Territory of Wisconsin gathered 
together in 1846 to write a Constitution, two members of the body came, 
as it were, from different worlds. The member from Racine County was 
Marshall Strong, who was 33 at the time the convention. Strong was the 
son of a judge, born in Amherst, Massachusetts and educated at Amherst 
College. He became a lawyer and moved to the Wisconsin territory in 
1836. He was elected to the Territorial Council, a body organized for the 
purposes of revising the territorial laws in anticipation of statehood. In 
January of 1846 Gust a few months prior· to the events I shall describe), 
8. The debate in the United States House of Representatives prior to the 
overwhelming passage of a bankruptey reform bill was replete with language that sought 
to "moralize" debt by legal means. See Katharine Q. Seelye, House Passes Bankruptcy 
Reform Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 11., 1998, at A22 (quoting Representative Scott Mcinnis, 
R. Colorado: "[This bill] represents another example of this Congress's efforts to 
encourage individual responsibility. We will re-notify people that they do need to be held 
accountable for their debts that they. have accumulated. We will remind them about . 
keeping their word. We will remind them about 'Don't go out and spend:money that you 
don't have.' . . . If you can't afford it (he said, nearly shouting],_ don't buy it."). 
9. See Calvin Woodard, Reality and Social Reform: The Transition from l.Aissez-
Faire to the Welfare State, 12 YALE L.J ~ 286 (1962) (des_cribing nineteenth·century 
reevaluation of poverty from a problem of personal morality to an economic problem that 
could be addressed with state action). 
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while he was away attending to the work of the Territorial Council, his 
wife and children died in a fire that also destroyed his home in Racine. 10 
The tragedy evoked the sympathy of the entire Territory. Popular 
acclamation compelled Strong to stand for election as Racine County's 
delegate to the Constitutional Convention, and he was elected 
overwhelmingly. Strong ultimately resigned his position as delegate to 
the Convention (in large part because of the disagreement over the 
Exemption Clause that we shall consider), and subsequently used all of 
his efforts to secure the defeat of the Constitution. 11 After his 
resignation from the Convention, Strong may have lost some of the 
confidence of the populace, 12 and gradually faded from public life. He 
died at his home in Racine in 1864. 
The member from Rock County was David Noggle. Unlike Marshall 
Strong, .David Noggle was no a child of privilege. Born of pioneer 
parents in Pennsylvania, Noggle spent time working in a factory in New 
York City and as a fartn hand in Illinois. Self-educated, Noggle studied 
law in his free time while working on the farm. Noggle was admitted to 
the bar and began his practice in Beloit in 1839.13 Thirty-seven years old 
at the time of the Convention of 1846, Noggle was one of the more 
influential and original thinkers of the Convention. After the Convention, · 
Noggle's career went in the opposite direction from Strong,s.: in 1869, 
10. See THE CONVENTION OF 1846, at 793 (Milo M. Quaife ed. 
1919)[hereinafter QUAIFE, CONVENTION]. 
11. See Marshall Strong, Speech to the Territorial Legislature Opposing the 
Ratification of the Constitution (February 5, 1847), reprinted in THE STRUGGLE OVER 
RATIFICATION 235-62 (Milo M. Quaife ed. 1920)[hereinafter QUAIFE, RATIFICATION}. 
In April of 1847, after four months of intense debate, the proposed Constitution was voted 
down by 59% of the population. See THE AITAINMENT OF STATEHOOD v-vii(Milo M. 
Quaife ed. 1928)[hereinafter QUAIFE, ATIAINMENT}; QUAIFE, RATIFICATION, supra. at 
698. In December of that year delegates met in Madison to draft a second attempt at a 
Constitution, which contained a somewhat weaker version of an Exemption Clause. See 
QUAIFE, A IT AINMENT, supra, at 44-47. The second draft of the Constitution was ratified 
by 74% of the popular vote in March 1848. See id. at vii. The current Wisconsin 
Constitution still contains exemption language: "The privilege of the debtor to enjoy the 
necessary comforts of life shall be recognized by wholesome laws, exempting a reasonable 
amount of property from seizure or sale for the payment of any debt or liability hereafter 
contracted." WIS. CONST., art~ I, sec. 17. 
12. Strong's performance at the Convention, even prior to the debate over the 
proposed Exemption Clause, seemed to have diminished his popular credibility. See 
Letter from the Convention to the Platteville Independent American (November 8, 1846) 
reprinted in QUAIFE, RATIFICATION, supra note 11, at 118-19 ("Marshall M. Strong, who 
was a prominent man and regarded as certain of high prefertnent in the new order of 
things when we assume state sovereignty . . . is now considered by all as effectually laid 
out and to be trusted by none . . . . "). 
13. See QUAIFE, CONVENTION, supra note 10, at 784. 
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Noggle was appointed by President Ulysses S. Grant to be Chief Justice 
• 
of the Territory of Idaho. Noggle served in that capacity until 1874 and 
died four years later. 14 
On December 7, 1846 the member from Racine County and the 
member from Rock County clashed bitterly over the issue of whether an 
Exemption Clause should be included in the organic law of the nascent 
state of Wisconsin. 15 As described by Strong, the provision under 
discussion provided that "forty acres of land, to be selected by the owner, 
shall be exempt from sale on execution issued on judgment obtained for 
debt contracted after the adoption of this constitution. "16 
Such a provision, exempting or shielding some of a debtor's property 
from being seized and sold by creditors looking to rnake good on the 
debt, is now a quite conunon feature of the debt collection laws of the 
states and of federal bankruptcy law. 17 But in 1846, an exemption law 
was something new. 18 Strong began his passionate opposition to the 
proposed ~xemption Clause by suggesting that the provision was novel 
and untried, noting that "(n]othing similar . . . can be found in the 
constitutions of any state except Texas, and surely we will not go to that 
noted asylum for all the desperadoes in the country for examples of public 
morals and correct laws on the collection of debts. "19 
14. See id. at 785. 
• 
15. Territorial Governor Henry Dodge issued a proclamation formally declaring 
the popular ratification of the Wisconsin Constitution in April 1848, and one month later 
Congress passed an act admitting Wisconsin to the United States. See QUAIFE, 
ATIAINMENT, supra note .11, at vii. . 
16. QUAIFE, CONVENTION, supra note 10, at 649. A neighboring section of the 
proposed constitution, treating the property rights of married women, was perhaps equally 
controversial. See id. at 631. 
17. See; e.g., NBRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 118 (compiling state and federal 
exemption statutes). 
18. At the time of the 1846 Wisconsin convention, only the Texas Constitution, 
ratified in 1845, contained exemption language. A Mexican statute of 1829, following 
Spanish law, had made exemption laws applicable to the Mexican territory of Texas, and 
Texas enacted a similar statute for itself ten years later. See Joseph W. McKnight, 
Protection of the Family Home from Seizure by Creditors: The Sources and Evolution of 
a Legal Principle, 86 SOUTHWESTERN HIST. Q., 369, 369 (1983). Besides Texas, the 
states of Mississippi, Georgia, Alabama and Florida all had exemption legislation prior 
to 1846. See McKnight at 396, n.81. See also Vern Countryman, Bankruptcy and the 
Individual Debtor-And a Modest Proposal to Return to the Seventeenth Century, 32 
CATH. U. L. REV. 810 (1983). 
19. QUAIFE, CONVENTION, supra note 10, at 647 48. See also McKnight, supra 
note 18, at 393 ("The American financial crisis of 1837, which precipitated the movement 
of so many distressed debtors to Texas, was a likely catalyst to the 1839 Texas enactment 
[of exemption legislation].") . 
• 
• 
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• 
Aside from its novelty, Strong believed that the Exemption Clause 
would amount to a constitutional license to fraud, calling it the "knave's 
magna carta. ''20 So Strong opines from the floor: 
Suppose a man in embarrassed circumstances residing in some 
town in the state of New York near a farmer worth some five 
thousand dollars. Under some pretence he procures his 
endorsement to that amount. Having obtained the, money, and 
• 
read our glorious constitution, and converted his property into 
cash, he comes to Wisconsin and purchases a valuable flouring 
mill and the forty acres upon which it stands. Soon the farmer 
is compelled to pay the endorsed notes; his property is, all sold 
for that purpose-; his wife and children are turned out upon the 
world, destitute and penniless. He follows his worthy neighbor 
to Wisconsin, ascertains his place of residence, calls upon him, 
and finds him sleek~ contented, surrounded with all the luxuries 
of life-, and perhaps exceeding polite, withal. But the farmer is 
inforn1ed that it is not convenient for the man to pay him then. 
He calls upon a constitutional lawyer to ascertain what remedy 
he has, and the lawyer very gravely says to him -
''Sir, the law furnishes you with no remedy. Our wise men 
in the days when the constitution was n1ade anticipated such 
cases as these and have expressly provided that your worthy 
friend shall be protected in the enjoyment of what he has. 
Possession was for1nerly only nine points in the law, but it is 
now ten. The reason of the law is this, that every n1an should 
be protected in holding what he has in his own possession, no 
matter how he came by it, for lawsuits to ascertain these 
conflicting rights are very expensive. Besides you should not 
repose confidence in any of the hun1an race, and as it seems you 
have, you are therefore justly punished therefor. "21 
The upshot of such a law that privileges debtors at the expense of 
creditors, according to Strong, is bloodshed: "Pass this act, and I predict 
that violence and murder will abound. "'22 
Strong also makes an argument about the long-term effects of an 
Exemption Clause upon the system of credit: 
20. QUAIFE, CONVENTION, supra, note 10; at 657. 
21. /d. at 650-51. 
22. /d. at 65 1. 
• 
• 
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No matter how much property a man may have, or what kind 
of property it may be, so long as he is able to convert it all into 
a valuable forty acre tract, which will be exempt from 
execution, no man can trust him without knowing that it is in 
the debtor's power at any time to deprive him of all legal 
remedy to collect the-debt. The consequence is, then, that at 
one fell swoop you destroy all credit. . . . 
• 
. . .. . 
. . . [C]redit is not only the bond, but the distinguishing 
mark of civilized society. 23 
Strong's opposition culminates in a promise: "Sir, I dare not vote for 
this section! I will not vote for the constitution if it contains it, either 
here or at the polls. But, on the contrary, w~ll spare neither time, or 
exertions, or means to defeat it." In fact, on the afternoon of December 
7, 1846 (moments after Strong's speech in opposition and David Noggle's 
response) the Convention voted 61 to 34 in favor of the article including 
the Exemption Clause.24 Immediately after the vote, Marshall Strong 
resigned his delegacy and returned to Racine to mount his opposition.25 
What explains Strong's desperate tone? Why does he put his back 
to the wall on this issue? Perhaps one thing on Strong's mind was the 
phenomenon summed up in the phrase "Shays' Rebellion," a series of 
events that showed the shocking side of a Populism gone bad. Daniel 
Shays had been a captain during the U.S. Revolutionary War. After the 
war, Shays returned to his Massachusetts home deeply in debt.26 The 
country was tom by a post-war depression that had robbed the currency 
of much pf its valu.e. Shays and his followers (many of whom were also 
23. /d. at 652-53 .. 
24. /d. at 670. 
' 
25. See id. at 673. Strong's resignation was described five days later by the 
.Madison Democrat newspaper as a "political suicide." QUAIFE, RATIFICATION, supra 
note ll, at 144. 
26. Shays' situation was typical of his countrymen. As one Massachusetts farmer 
opined in 1786: 
What are the present state of facts as they represent the yeomanry of this 
Commonwealth? Our taxes are so high, together with calls of a private 
nature, that our stock and cattle are greatly diminished .... the greater part 
then of those who gloriously supported our independence now find their 
moveables vanishing like empty shades, their lands sinking under their feet. 
Massachusens Ga,zene (October 20, 1786), reprinted in DAVID P. SZATMARY, SHAYS' 
REBELLION 36 (1980). Szatmary describes the post-Revolutionary War squeeze British 
merchants of manufactured goods put on U.S. retailers of those goods for specie, and the 
corresponding increase in debt actions for specie brought against the yeomanry. See id. 
at 19~36. 
• 
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indebted veterans of the Revolutionary War) rose in August of 1786 and 
shut down the courts in Northampton so that debtors could not be tried 
and imprisoned. Shays and his men then broke up the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court in Springfield in an attempt to avoid being tried for 
treason, and ultimately captured the state arsenal. The federal army 
intervened in February of 1787, leading to the capture of Shays and the 
end of the Rebellion. Many historians look to Shays' Rebellion, seen as 
evidence of the unsustainable nature of the Confederation, as the 
proximate, cause of the federal constitutional convention that met in 
Philadelphia beginning in the summer of that year. 27 
One condition that made Shays' Rebellion possible may strike a 
familiar chord with the observer of our own contemporary debt crisis: 
namely, the depersonalization of the relationship between debtor and 
creditor. In the time of Daniel Shays, promissory notes, which could be 
assigned and transferred among creditors, were just beginning to replace 
"book debt, as the chief mode of credit transactions. As described by 
historian Jonathan Chu, book debt was the 
delineation of a series of mutual promises and obligations 
rendered in precise economic terms and carried in a merchant's 
account book. The process by which book debt was 
accumulated denoted a constant pattern of interaction and a 
constant ebb and flow of credit and debit. Payable on demand, 
book debt was a legally enforceable economic obligation, but it 
might go years without settlement or collection since it also 
represented ties of social relationships. Under these 
circumstances repayment rested upon the trust of the creditor 
and the ability of the debtor to provide labor or goods when the 
occasion arose over a lifetime. 28 · 
Promissory notes, on the other hand, "could change hands at a dazzling 
and confusing, rate. . . . [P]romissory notes facilitated economic 
27. So wrote editor Benjamin Russell in the Massachusetts Sentinel shortly after 
the establishment of the federal Constitution: 
In investigating the causes which gave life to the happy form of government 
which we shall ere long be under, the Historian will not forget the era of the 
late insurrections in this Commonwealth. The insurrections . . . must be 
considered as the causes of bringing in existence, at a much earlier period 
than would otherwise have been, the [federal] government. 
Quoted in Robert A. Gross, The Uninvited Guest: Daniel Shays and the Constitution, in 
IN DEBT TO SHAYS: THE BICENTENNIAL OF AN AGRARIAN REBELLIONS (Robert A. Gross 
ed. 1993). 
28. Jonathan M. Chu, Debt Litigation and Shays' Rebellion, in IN DEBT TO 
SHAYS: THE BICENTENNIAL OF AN AGRARIAN REBELLION, supra note 27, at 82. 
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transactions; but in so doing, they also eliminated the moderating effects 
of multifaceted social relationships when hard times struck. "29 Such a 
phenomenon of "facelessness" is also an earmark of our own times, as 
unsecured debt moves from the comer grocer to some corporation distant 
and unseen. 
Marshall Strong was undoubtedly influence_d by a· concern that the 
same sort of pro-debtor populism that motivated the lawlessness of Shays' 
Rebellion was returning to trouble the drafting of Wisconsin's organic 
law. Indeed, less than one month before the Exemption Clause debate 
and Strong's subsequent resignation, the Convention had considered an 
article that would have c:onstitutionally prohibited all debt collection 
laws:.30 Sponsoring the proposed article was John Crawford, the 
delegate representing Milwaukee County at the Convention. Crawford, 
who was fifty-four years old at the time of the Convention, was a for1ner 
military general who had gone into business. No friend of lawyers, 
Crawford. advocated the abolition of debt collection law in part because 
he thought that debt collection was a make-work industry for lawyers.31 
Aside from a few vintage nineteenth-century lawyer jokes, 32 Crawford 
also advanced the notion that abolishing debt collection laws would have 
the beneficial effect of destroying the system of credit: 
My views on this subject are that it will, in a measure, put a 
stop to the credit system, which I consider a very great curse to 
both debtor and creditor. But in the end it will have a glorious 
effect, for it will place men upon their honor ... ~ [a]nd a[n] 
honest man will have no trouble in getting all necessary 
acconunodations. . . . The collection laws we shall have if this 
resolution does not pass will destroy the natural confidence 
between man and man, and the· debtor will say to the creditor 
... "You hold a rod or iron over me, and you may make the 
best use of it you can; I do not consider myself honorably 
bound to pay it. "33 
29. /d. at 82-83. 
30. See QUAIFE, CONVENTION, supra note 10, at 81 ("Mr. Crawford introduced 
the following resolution; which was read to wit: 'Resolved, That all laws for the collection 
of debts shall forever be prohibited within this state."'). 
31. See id. at 341-42. 
32. "Mr. Chainnan, if in speaking of lawyers I am to be accused of descending 
to low epithets, the-fault is not with me; I have to descend to low grounds to reach the 
object of my search." JOHN CRAWFORD, SPEECH ON ABOUSHING· LAWS FOR THE 
COLLECTION OF DEBTS BE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE 
(October 31, 1846), reprinted in id. at 348. 
33. JOHN .CRAWFORD, SPEECH INTRODUCING THE MEASURE TO ABOLISH LAWS 
REGULATING THE COLLECTION OF DEBTS (October 10, 1846),_ reprinted in id. at 94-96. 
1998:747 Wisconsin Exemption Clause Debate of 1846 757 
Crawford's resolution was voted down on November 9, 1846, and 
twelve days later Crawford offered a second provision to come to the aid 
of the debtor: the first version of the Exemption Clause. The initial 
formulation of the Exemption Clause, advanced by Crawford, directed 
that the ''legislature shall provide by law for exemption from taxation and 
execution five hundred dollars worth of household furniture, mechanics' 
tools, farming utensils, professors' books, or other property belonging to 
each family in this state. "34 A resolution introduced on the same day 
sought to preserve from execution a parcel of land, and it was this 
formulation of the exemption idea that received the stinging denunciation 
of Marshall Strong on December 7, 1846.35 
At the conclusion of Strong's passionate oration, David Noggle rose 
to take the floor in defense of the Exemption Clause. Noggle claimed 
that he had 
until this moment . . . designed casting a silent vote in favor of 
the article; but, sir, when a provision, proposed to be made a 
part of the fundamental law of the land, one founded in so much 
equity and justice as is the one now before us, containing 
principles in which the honest laborer, the poor n1an, and the 
honest yeo of the country are so deeply interested, I 
cannot silently sit by and witness the sophisticated assaults of 
Discussions about the role of credit in the developing economy and society were very 
mucb at the forefront of the Exemption Clause debate. Compare Editorial of the 
SOUTHPORT TELEGRAPH(December24, 1847)("Do away [with] your laws relating to debts 
and bankruptcy throw away your legal standards of right and wrong in regards to 
matters of pecuniary deal and obligation; let integrity of character be the sole basis of 
credit - and you will soon find a moral sentiment and discrimination springing up in 
community [that will] furnish a better security for the honest and faithful discharge of 
mutual obligations and for safety in business transactions, than any legal system of 
coercion or regulation that human wisdom can devise.") with Editorial of the WISCONSIN 
ARGUS (Madison)(December 7, 1847)("Four-fifths of our wealthy men were once poor. 
Ask them how they became rich and they will generally tell you that they started on 
capital obtained by credit, and that without credit they must have remained comparatively 
poor. It is impossible to imagine any stroke of policy which would so effectually check 
the growing wealth of a nation and so suddenly put it upon a retrograde movement as the 
suspension of credit; for the poor, for the most part, would forever remain poor for want 
of capital to aid industry, and the rich would become poor for want of industry to aid their 
capital."), reprinted in QUAIFE, ATTAINMENT, supra note 11, at 65, 53. 
34. JOHN CRAWFORD, REsOLUTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
(November 21, 1846), reprinted in QUAIFE, CONVENTION, supra note 10, at 516. 
35. See JOHN MANAHAN, REsOLUTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
(November 21, 1846), reprinted in id. at 517 ("Resolved, that the legislature shall have 
power to prohibit by law, from forced sale, a certain portion of the property of all heads 
of families not to exceed 200 acres of land.") 
758 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
the gentletnan from Racine [Marshall Strong] upon the article 
and its friends without endeavoring in my feeble manner to free 
it from some of the abuses by him thus heaped upon it .. 36 
Noggle's first strategy of defense is to sound the class themes that 
typically mark discussions of the regulation of debt: 
• 
[The] [g]entlentan seem[s] very indignant at the idea of 
providing for the poor man and not for the rich. Sir, it is too 
true for the credit of this country, that the greatest portion of its 
legislation is designed alone for the rich; the motto is too 
conunon·, "Take care of the rich, and the rich will take care of 
the poor." And now strange it is that when this article made its 
appearance, raising but a feeble appearance in behalf of the poor 
laborer, we should so suddenly hear the cry of "fraud, fraud, 
fraud" from so tnany honorable members upon this floor, who 
would not have been in the least suspected of having the 
interests of the conunon people at heart. 37 
Aside from this reference. to "class conflict,'' Noggle, in fact, may 
have been hard pressed to present an account of when the law should 
absolve debtors from paying their debts. After all, we conunonly take it 
as a matter of simple justice that a person should pay What she owes. An 
1847 discussion by the editors of Madison's Wisconsin Argus newspaper 
thus put the question: 
Upon what principle, then, is an exemption of property from the 
just detnands of the creditor founded? We answer negatively 
that it is not founded in the principle of justice. Justice requires 
that a tnan should pay his debt simply because he owes it, and 
not because he is able or unable. . . . The principle of justice 
. . .. admits of no exemption, but pursues the debtor with its 
inflexible demands to the last farthing he has, and holds him 
bound for the balance, if there be a farthing still due. 38 
' 
36. /d. at 658. 
'37. ld. at 664; see also ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA •s UNFINISHED 
REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 326 (1988)(quoting a "Georgia scalawag delegate~ at the time 
of Southern Reconstruction as saying, "This is a strife between eapital and labor,. between 
the wealthy aristocrats and tbe great mass of the people.") 
38. Editorial, WISCONSIN ARGUS (Madison), Nov. 16, 184 7, reprinted in QUAIFE, 
ATTAINMENT, supra note 11, at 44-45 . 
• 
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But if exemptions are not a_ matter of justice, then where can their 
source be found? What lies opposite of "justice" on the ledger that would 
yield relief to a debtor from collection on a debt that he deliberately 
contracted? There _are at least three possible, and perhaps indistinct, 
answers: mer:cy, equity, and a consideration of the social and economic 
factors that may affect debtor and creditor behavior. 
On the theme of umercy, '' the editors of the Wisconsin Argus 
continued: 
We answer affirmatively that [the exemption of property] is 
founded in the principle of mercy, and in that alone. The 
question then arises: To what extent does the principle of mercy 
den1and exemptions? It may be answered in general terms that 
its demand extends no further than to secure the debtor against 
irmnediate suffering by the rigorous operation of the principle 
of justice, and not even thus far when the arrest of justice would 
operate unmercifully up_on the creditor. For example, if a man 
be so poor that he has but two loaves of bread in the world and 
honestly owes his neighbor one, and that neighbor has none, the 
principles of both justice and mercy require that he should· pay 
•t 39 1 .. 
Such a calculus of mercy counsels a messy balancing of the straits of a 
particular debtor against a particular creditor. A creditor who is a 
hospitalized victim of the debtor's tort may win a greater pull on .one's 
interpretation of mercy than the creditor who is a bank. 
Perhaps the law's name for "mercy" is "equity." An example of the 
law's use of equity to afford debtor relief is the "stay-law," which would 
literally stay the processes of debt execution in order to afford temporary 
relief to the debtor. Such laws were enacted in times of economic crisis 
and, while courts would generally strike these laws as unconstitutional, 
the laws would be effective long enough to afford the relief necessary to 
mitigate the rough edges of the financial downturns.40 One Wisconsin 
case (post-statehood) presents a good example of a court's use of equitable 
reasoning. to justify such debtor relief. In Von Baumbach v. Bade, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a version of a stay-law, writing: 
• 
Although such changes are in general exceedingly unwise and 
unjust, yet if from sudden and unlooked-for reverses or 
39. 
40 !0 
(l935). 
Id. at 45. . 
See CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY lN UNITED STATES HISTORY 148 
• 
• 
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.misfortune, or any other cause, the existing remedies become so 
stringent in all or a particular class of actions that great and 
extensive sacrifices of property will ensue, without benefit to 
the creditor or relief to the debtor, a relaxation of the remedies 
becomes a positive duty which the State owes to its citizens .. 
. . In passing upon questions like the present, Courts must look 
behind the statute itself and take notice of the causes which led 
to its enactment; for otherwise, they would be unable to 
determine whether its regulations are reasonable or not, or were 
demanded by the state of the times or the financial situation of 
the country. . . . I cannot say that the delay occasioned by it is 
so great or so unreasonable that it so obstructs or embarrasses 
proceedings for foreclosure on the part of the mortgagee as to 
make it under any circumstances unconstitutional and void.41 
The legislative enactment and judicial preservation of such stay-laws 
seems a sort of inexact "legal override" to the demands of justice written 
across the face of the contract between debtor and creditor .42 
A final justification for debtor relief lies in the scheme of incentives 
that it provides to shape debtor behavior. In his defense of the Exemption 
Clause, David Noggle touches on the idea that giving debtors a fresh start 
will liberate them to be productive members of society in a way that 
redounds to the conunon good: "The gentletttan from Racine says he 
believes [the Exemption Clause] willtnake knaves and rascals. Sir; I 
believe it will tend to elevate the poor; it will level them up instead of 
down; it will tend to 111ake the lower classes of conununity Independent, 
high minded, and honorable citizens. "43 Thus, the essence of the "fresh 
start'' idea: When people are saddled with debt, they lack incentive to be 
productive. For a debtor who is indebted past a certain point, the 
question becomes, ''Why?,': Why go to work? Why come up with 
ideas? Why struggle and strive when the debtor knows that her fate is 
dictated by her circumstances? When that debtor, on the other hand, is 
liberated from the debt that had kept her down, she becomes free to create 
and produce in a way that benefits the entire conununity. 
The fresh start redounds not only to the economic productivity of the 
debtor, but also to her personal dignity. Noggle, demonstrating his 
personal familiarity with the debtor class, makes the point: 
41. 9 Wis. 559 (1859); see also Warren~ supra note 40, at 88-89. 
42. See PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: 
INSOLVENCY-, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY, 1607-1900 (1974); FONER, 
supra note 37, at 212 and 326-27; Mark Bradshaw, ,The Role of Politics and Economics 
in Early American Bankruptcy Law, 18 WHITilER L. REv. 739 (1997). 
43. QUAIFE, CONVENTION, supra note 10, at 664. 
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The people have sense enough to know that the gentleman [Strong] 
preaches false doctrine when he assumes that making men 
independent tnakes rascals of them. They know, sir, that the very 
germ of fraud is necessity. Remove man's dependence and you 
remove in a great measure the inducements to dishonesty; but reduce 
him to penury and want and still continue to oppress him and you 
invite him to conunit fraud, knavery, and every other species of 
robbery or dishonesty to sustain himself. Make your laws search the 
poor man's granary, his closet, and his bedroom to satisfy its 
execution, and you teach him to hide their contents .... 44 
Debtor relief laws provide incentives for shaping not only debtor 
behavior, but creditor behavior as well. Noggle thus contended that 
protecting some of the debtors' assets through exemption will force 
creditors to be more discriminating in the lending of money: 
A fundamental law like the one now under consideration would 
not, as the gentleman imagines, annihilate credit; but it would 
no doubt annihilate that spurious, indiscriminating species of 
credit that is as readily granted to the spendthrift and the loafer, 
who never desire any property or means to be sheltered by the 
exemption, as to the industrious individual; yet, to the same 
extent that it enabled the former to obtain credit and 
accommodation, it would exhaust the means and the substance 
of the honest, prompt-paying debtor by making him pay (in the 
shape of high prices) the losses occasioned by accommodating 
the prodigal. 45 · 
Noggle's claim is that a legal rule making collection more difficult for 
creditors (by moving some debtor's assets beyond the creditor's reach) 
will cause creditors to be more discerning of credit-worthiness when 
lending money in the first instance.46 Perhaps along with providing a 
44. ld. at 666-67. 
45. Id. at 665. 
46. A similar question arises in the context of contemporary legislative initiatives 
to add a "means test" requirement for allowing a consumer to file a Chapter 7 liquidation 
instead of a Chapter 13 plan of debt reorganization and repayment. See, e.g., Congress 
Might Make Debt Harder to Escape, BOSTON GLOBE, March 10, 1998, at A1. Such a 
means test would shift the cost of determining the credit-worthiness of potential borrowers 
from the lending institution (before the loan is made) to the court system (to evaluate 
future capacity to pay once relief has been sought). Such a proposal begs the institutional 
question of "Which institution (i.e., the Lender or the Court) is better equipped to 
determine the credit-worthiness of a borrower?" See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, 
IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES (1994). 
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"fresh start'' for debtors, debtor relief laws may also provide. a "more 
• 
careful re-start" for creditors. 
• 
While"mercy'' and "equity'' present themselves as categories beyond 
measure, perhaps the project of considering the incentives (for both debtor 
and creditor) established by debtor relief laws is a science more given to 
measurement and calibration. The calculation of when it is better to 
execute the formal demands of the contract or when it is better to override 
·the contract and afford extra-contractual relief to the debtor (calculation, 
in other words, of when a debt is not worth paying) is the central task of 
debt collection law. 
The ultimate choice by Wisconsin (and eventually other states) to 
embrace a fresh start policy in its debt collection laws was motivated, at 
least in part, by a desire to champion economic growth. Much has been 
written regarding such efforts by nineteenth-century legal actors that 
shaped legal institutions to encourage entrepreneurship.47 The present 
question, perhaps now better informed by a reading of history, is whether 
we want to return to a posture of "moralizing" debt by legal means as we 
tum to face the twentieth-first century. 
III. DEBTORS AND IMMIGRANTS 
This Article concludes with two bits of unfinished business. I have 
asserted that ·"Debt" is a central organizing categ.ory in much of the law 
of the United States. A central case, of course, is the law of bankruptcy, 
which extends a "fresh start'' to the debtor based on the calculation that 
the debtor can do more good, both for herself and for her community, 
when released from financial burdens and restored to firm financial 
footing. 
The logic of the fresh start also animates inunigration law. The rules 
. that govern the process of admitting migrants and investing them with 
meaningful rights and remedies is a body of law that lies close to the 
heart of this or any country's self-definition. We have heard that this 
nation of immigrants was started, in ·part; by people fleeing the debts 
(both financial and structural) of the old country. This nation then 
crossed a continent westward as people fled debts incurred in the eastern 
states and territories.48 When the United States exhausted its geographic 
frontier (as Frederick Jackson Turner described it) near the close of the 
nineteenth century, it embraced a legislative frontier in the fresh start 
47. See generally WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN 
NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956). 
48. See, e.g .. , McKnight, supra note 18, at 375 ("Moving West was a frequent 
early nineteenth century .response to the series of economic crises in the new American 
nation~"). · 
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policies that were finally made part of continuous federal law in the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898.49 The experience of the United States has 
shown that inunigrants, if only released from the old-world burdens of a 
stultifying class structure that guarded access to wealth, opportunities, and 
hope, could raise up with their bare hands a great nation in a matter of 
decades-. 
Yet the war111 glow fades from our speech when the subject turns 
from historical ruminations on "this nation of inunigrants" to 
contemporary concerns of "inmugration control. 1.t Just as the rhetorical 
power of the fresh start wanes for the New Debtor, it wanes also for the 
New Immigrant, and it is an important project to establish why this is so~ 
The second bit of unfinished business pertains to the concept of 
"Debt" itself. Much of the socio-legal history of the United States, both 
the stories that do us honor in the telling and the stories that our troubled 
consciences will not allow us to forget, can be organized along the 
concept of Debt: The Debt that the working class owes to the propertied 
class; the Debt that slaves owe to their masters; the Debt that criminals 
owe to society; the Debt that inurligrants owe to the receiving country. 
Much of the law of the United States, in its perfectly ordinary operation, 
is about Debt. But the genius of the law of the United States is about 
releasing captives of Debt from debts that are false, or from debts that are 
not worth paying. It is the concept of the "debt not worth paying" that 
merits much further attention. 
• 
49. See FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
(1947); see also FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, FRONTIER AND SECTION (1961); Margaret 
F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, The Market for Deadbeats, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 201 (1996) . 
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